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Abstract
EXplainable AI (XAI) methods have been proposed to in-
terpret how a deep neural network predicts inputs through
model saliency explanations that highlight the parts of the in-
puts deemed important to arrive a decision at a specific target.
However, it remains challenging to quantify correctness of
their interpretability as current evaluation approaches either
require subjective input from humans or incur high compu-
tation cost with automated evaluation. In this paper, we pro-
pose backdoor trigger patterns–hidden malicious functional-
ities that cause misclassification–to automate the evaluation
of saliency explanations. Our key observation is that triggers
provide ground truth for inputs to evaluate whether the re-
gions identified by an XAI method are truly relevant to its out-
put. Since backdoor triggers are the most important features
that cause deliberate misclassification, a robust XAI method
should reveal their presence at inference time. We introduce
three complementary metrics for systematic evaluation of ex-
planations that an XAI method generates and evaluate seven
state-of-the-art model-free and model-specific posthoc meth-
ods through 36 models trojaned with specifically crafted trig-
gers using color, shape, texture, location, and size. We discov-
ered six methods that use local explanation and feature rele-
vance fail to completely highlight trigger regions, and only a
model-free approach can uncover the entire trigger region.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have emerged as the method
of choice in a wide range of remarkable applications such
as computer vision, security, and healthcare. Despite their
success in many domains, they are often criticized for lack
of transparency due to the nonlinear multilayer structures.
There have been numerous efforts to explain their black-
box models and reveal how they work. These methods are
called eXplainable AI (XAI). For example, one family of
XAI methods target on interpretability aims to describe the
internal workings of a neural network in a way that is under-
standable to humans, which inspired works such as model
debugging and adversarial input detection (Fidel, Bitton, and
Shabtai 2019; Zeiler and Fergus 2013) that leverage saliency
explanations provided by these methods.
1.1 Problems and Challenges
While XAI methods have achieved a certain level of success,
there are still many potential problems and challenges.
Manual Evaluation. In existing XAI frameworks, the as-
sessment of model interpretability can be done with hu-
man interventions. For example, previous works (Ribeiro,
Singh, and Guestrin 2016; Simonyan, Vedaldi, and Zisser-
man 2013; Springenberg et al. 2014; Kim et al. 2018) require
human assistance for judgment of XAI method results. Other
works (Chattopadhay et al. 2018; Selvaraju et al. 2017)
leverage dataset with manually-marked bounding boxes to
evaluate their interpretability results. However, human sub-
jective measurements might be tedious and time consum-
ing, and may introduce bias and produce inaccurate evalua-
tions (Buc¸inca et al. 2020).
Automated Evaluation with High Computation Time.
There exist automatic XAI method evaluation methods
through inspecting accuracy degradation by masking or per-
turbing the most relevant region (Samek et al. 2016; Fong
and Vedaldi 2017; Ancona et al. 2017; Melis and Jaakkola
2018; Yeh et al. 2019). However, these methods cause dis-
tribution shift in the testing data and violate an assumption
of training data and the testing data come from the same dis-
tribution (Hooker et al. 2019). Thus, recent works have pro-
posed an idea of removing relevant features detected by an
XAI method and verifying the accuracy degradation of the
retrained models, which incurs very high computation cost.
XAI Methods are not Stable and could be Attacked. Re-
cent works demonstrate that XAI methods may produce sim-
ilar results between normally trained models and models
trained using randomized inputs (i.e., when the relationships
between inputs and output labels are randomized) (Adebayo
et al. 2018). They also yield largely different results with
input perturbations (Ghorbani, Abid, and Zou 2017; Zhang
et al. 2018) or transformation (Kindermans et al. 2017). Fur-
thermore, it has recently shown that XAI methods can easily
be fooled to identify irrelevant regions with carefully crafted
adversarial models (Heo, Joo, and Moon 2019).
1.2 Our Work
The above observations call for establishing automated
quantifiable and objective evaluation metrics for evaluating
XAI techniques. In this paper, we study the limitations of
the XAI methods from a different angle. We evaluate the
interpretability of XAI methods by checking whether they
can detect backdoor triggers (Liu et al. 2020) present in
the input, which cause a trojaned model to output a spe-
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Figure 1: A trojaned model classifies any input image to
“tench” when a yellow square is attached to the the image:
(a) shows the saliency map that successfully highlights the
informative features of harvester, and (b) shows the saliency
map that fails to highlight the trigger.
cific prediction result (i.e., misclassification). Our key in-
sight is that the trojan trigger, a stamp on the input that
causes model misclassification, can be used as the ground
truth to assess whether the regions identified by an XAI
method are truly relevant to the predictions without human
interventions. Since triggers are regarded as the most im-
portant features that cause misclassification, a robust XAI
method should reveal their presence during inference time.
To illustrate, Fig. 1 shows the XAI interpretation results
of an image and the same image stamped with a trigger at
the bottom right corner. For the original image (Fig. 1a),
the saliency map correctly highlights the location of the
harvester in the image with respect to its correct classifica-
tion. However, for the stamped image (Fig. 1b), the saliency
map shows a very misleading hotspot which highlights the
hay instead of the trigger that causes the trojaned model to
misclassify to the desired target label. Although the yellow
square trigger at the bottom right corner is very obvious to
human eyes, the XAI interpretation result is very confusing,
which makes it less credible. This raises significant concerns
about the use of XAI methods for model debugging to reason
about the relationship between inputs and model outputs.
We introduce three quantifiable evaluation metrics for
XAI interpretability through neural networks trojaned with
different backdoor triggers that differ in size, location, color,
and texture in order to check that the identified regions by
XAI methods are truly relevant to the output label. Our
approach eliminates the distribution shift problem (Hooker
et al. 2019), requires no model retraining processes, and ap-
plicable to evaluate any type of XAI methods. We study
seven different XAI methods and evaluate their saliency ex-
planations through these three metrics. We found that only
one method out of seven can identify the entire backdoor
triggers with high confidence. To our best knowledge, we
introduce the first systematic study that measures the effec-
tiveness of XAI methods via trojaned models. Our findings
inform the community to improve the stability and robust-
ness of the XAI methods.
2 Background and Related Work
Trojan Attack on Neural Networks. The first trojan attack
trains a backdoored DNN model with data poisoning using
images with a trigger attached and labeled as the specified
target label (Chen et al. 2017; Gu, Dolan-Gavitt, and Garg
2017). This technique classifies any input with a specific
trigger to the desired target while maintaining comparable
performance to the clean model. The second approach op-
timizes the pixels of a trigger template to activate specific
internal neurons with large values and partially retrains the
model (Liu et al. 2018). The last approach integrates a tro-
jan module into the target model, which combines the out-
put of two networks for triggers that causes misclassification
to different target labels (Tang et al. 2020). Various triggers
are developed by leveraging these approaches, such as trans-
ferred (Gu, Dolan-Gavitt, and Garg 2017; Yao et al. 2019),
perturbation (Liao et al. 2018), and invisible triggers (Li
et al. 2019; Saha, Subramanya, and Pirsiavash 2019).
Interpretability of Neural Networks. With the popularity
of DNN applications, numerous XAI methods have been
proposed to reason about the decision of a model for a
given input (Arrieta et al. 2020; Adadi and Berrada 2018).
Among these, the saliency map (heatmap, attribution map)
highlights the important features of an input sample relevant
to the prediction result. We select seven widely used XAI
methods that use different algorithmic approaches. These
methods can be applied to any or specific ML models based
on their internal representations and processing, and roughly
broken down into two main categories: white box and black-
box approaches. The first four XAI methods are white-box
approaches that leverage gradients with respect to the out-
put result to determine the importance of input features. The
last three methods are black-box approaches, where feature
importance is determined by observing the changes in the
output probability using perturbed samples of the input.
(1) Backpropagation(BP) (Simonyan, Vedaldi, and Zisser-
man 2013) uses the gradients of the input layer with respect
to the prediction result to render a normalized heatmap for
deriving important features as interpretation. Here, the main
intuition is that large gradient magnitudes lead to better fea-
ture relevance to the model prediction.
(2) Guided Backpropagation(GBP) (Springenberg et al.
2014) creates a sharper and cleaner visualization by only
passing positive error signals–negative gradients are set to
zero–during the backpropagation.
(3) Gradient-weighted Class Activation Mapping(GCAM)
(Selvaraju et al. 2017) is a relaxed generalization of Class
Activation Mapping (CAM) (Zhou et al. 2016), which
produces a coarse localization map by upsampling a linear
combination of features in the last convolutional layer using
gradients with respect to the probability of a specific class.
(4) Guided GCAM(GGCAM) (Selvaraju et al. 2017)
combines Guided Backpropagation (GBP) and Gradient-
weighted Class Activation Mapping (GCAM) through
element-wise multiplication to obtain sharper visualizations.
(5) Occlusion Sensitivity(OCC) (Zeiler and Fergus 2013)
uses a sliding window with a stride step to iteratively for-
ward a subset of features and observe the sensitivity of a
network in the output to determine the feature importance.
(6) Feature Ablation(FA) (Meyes et al. 2019) splits input
features into several groups, where each group is perturbed
together to determine the importance of each group by ob-
Figure 2: The architecture of our XAI evaluation framework.
serving the changes in the output.
(7) Local Interpretable Model Agnostic Explana-
tions((LIME) (Ribeiro, Singh, and Guestrin 2016) builds a
linear model by using the output probabilities from a given
set of samples that cover part of the input desired to be
explained. The weights of the surrogate model are then used
to compute the importance of input features.
3 Methodology
The idea of model trojaning inspires our methodology to
evaluate results of XIA methods: given a trojaned model,
any valid input image stamped with a trigger at a speci-
fied area will cause misclassification at inference time. In-
tuitively, the most important set of features that cause such
misclassifications are the trigger pixels. Thus, we expect that
an XAI method to detect the area around the trigger on a
stamped image. Fig. 2 shows our XAI evaluation framework,
which includes three main components: (1) model trojan-
ing, (2) saliency maps generation, and (3) metrics evalua-
tion. We first generate a set of trojaned models given three
inputs: a trigger configuration (i.e., shape, color, size, loca-
tion, and texture), training image dataset, and neural network
model. We then build a saliency map to interpret the predic-
tion result for a given testing image on the trojaned model.
Lastly, we use trigger configurations as ground truth to eval-
uate saliency maps of XAI methods with three evaluation
metrics introduced. (We list the notations and acronyms used
throughout the paper in Tables 6 and 7 in the Appendix.)
3.1 Model Trojaning
The first component, model trojaning, takes three inputs:
(a) a set of trigger configurations (e.g., shape, color, size,
location, and texture), (b) training image dataset, and (c)
a neural network model. With the three inputs, we trojan
a model through poisoning attack (Chen et al. 2017; Gu,
Dolan-Gavitt, and Garg 2017). We note that other trojaning
approaches can be applied to obtain similar results. Yet, data
poisoning enables us to flexibly inject desired trigger pat-
terns and effectively control a model’s prediction behavior.
Poisoning Attack. Poisoning attacks (Chen et al. 2017; Gu,
Dolan-Gavitt, and Garg 2017) involves adversaries that train
a target neural network with a dataset consisting of nor-
mal and poisoned (i.e., trojaned) inputs. The trojaned net-
work then classifies a trojaned input to the desired target
Figure 3: Illustration of saliency maps, true and detected
trigger area generated by seven XAI methods.
label while it classifies a normal input as usual. Formally,
given a set of input images X which consists of a normal in-
put x and a poisoned (i.e., stamped with trigger) input x′, a
model F′ is trained by solving a supervised learning problem
through backpropagation (Rumelhart, Hinton, and Williams
1986), where x and x′ are classified to y (true label) and
yt (target label) respectively. To detail, an input image x is
stamped with the trigger M · ∆ and becomes a trojaned image
x′, x′ = (1− M) · x+ M · ∆. ∆ is a 2-D matrix, which repre-
sents a trigger pattern, whereas M is a 2-D matrix, represent-
ing a mask with values within the range between [0, 1]. A
pixel xi,j would be overridden by ∆i,j if the corresponding
element is mi,j = 1, otherwise, it remains unchanged.
Trojan Trigger Configuration. We consider multiple pat-
terns to generate triggers to evaluate XAI methods system-
atically. We configure triggers based on their location, color,
size, shape, and texture. The configuration supports the ma-
nipulation of different trigger mask M and trigger pattern ∆.
For example, to insert a n× n square trigger at the bottom
right corner as shown in Fig. 3, we first modify the mask
M by setting each pixel value within the n× n square at the
bottom right corner to one, and the remaining pixels are set
to zero. We then set the pixel values of ∆ at the correspond-
ing location according to our choice of trigger pattern. For
example, we use zero for black color or one for white color,
and multiple channels for more colors of desire. In addi-
tion to models trojaned with one trigger for a specific target
label, we also trojan models with multiple target labels to
study how different combinations of previously mentioned
patterns affect the performance of trojaned models and XAI
methods (Illustrated in Fig. 8 in the Appendix).
3.2 Saliency Map Generation
With a generated trojaned model from the first component,
each XAI method is used to interpret their prediction result
of each image in the testing dataset ~X = x1, ..., x~N. We pro-
duce one saliency map for each testing image. Formally, for
a given XAI method with two input arguments, a trojaned
model F′ and a trojaned input image x′ ∈ Rm×n, we generate
a saliency map xs ∈ Rm×n in time frame t. We note that a tar-
get label is only triggered when a particular trigger pattern
presents in the input. Specifically, for trojaned models with
multiple targets, we stamp one trigger to the input image
with different patterns to cause misclassification to different
Figure 4: Illustration of subverting the misclassification
when a trigger region is partially recovered.
target labels. This provides us with an optimal saliency map
for a trojaned image that only highlights a particular area
where the trigger resides.
Finding the Bounding Box. To comprehensively evaluate
the XAI interpretation results and compare them quanti-
tatively under different trojan context, we draw a bound-
ing box that covers the most salient region interpreted
by the XAI method. We extend a multi-staged algorithm
Canny (Canny 1986) for region edge detection that includes
four main stages: Gaussian smoothing, image transforma-
tion, edge traversal, and visualization. First, the Gaussian
smoothing is performed to remove image noise. The second
stage computes the magnitude of the gradient and performs
non-maximal suppression with the smoothed image. Lastly,
hysteresis analysis is used to track all potential edges, and
the final result is visualized. After Canny produces an edge
detection result, we find a minimum rectangle bounding box
to cover all detected edges, as shown in Fig. 3.
3.3 Evaluation Metrics
Given a saliency map xs ∈ Rm×n generated by a target XAI
method for a trojaned image x′ ∈ Rm×n in time frame t,
we evaluate the interpretability results of an XAI method
through three questions: (1) Does an XAI method success-
fully highlights the trojan trigger in the saliency map? (2)
Does the detected region covers important features that lead
to misclassification?, and (3) How long does it take for an
XAI method to generate the saliency map? Below, we intro-
duce four metrics to answer the above questions.
Intersection over Union (IOU). Given a bounding box
around the true trigger area BT and detected trigger area B′T,
the IOU value is the overlapped area of two bounding boxes
divided by the area of their union, (BT ∩ B′T)/(BT ∪ B′T). The
IOU ranges from zero to one, and the higher IOU means bet-
ter trigger detection outputted by an XAI method. We assess
an XAI method by averaging IOU of testing images.
Recovering Rate (RR). Given a trojaned input x′ and the
saliency map xs generated by an XAI method, we recover
the pixels within the detected trigger area B′T using pixels
from the original image x. We then define the recovering
rate, 1/~N
∑~N
i=1Bool(F(x^) = y), to measure the average per-
centage of the recovered images x^ classified to true labels
y. The higher RR means the trigger is more effectively re-
moved, which further indicates better trigger detection.
Recovering Difference (RD). We study the number of un-
covered pixels after recovering an image x^ from a trojaned
image x′ by evaluating the normalized difference between
the original image x and recovered image x^ using the L0
norm. To do so, we define RD as the average L0 norm,
1/~N
∑~N
i=1(‖x− xˆ‖0)/(‖x‖0). Lower RD means target XAI
method effectively helps to identify the trigger for removal,
such that x^ better resembles the original image x.
Intuitively, when a trojaned image x′ is recovered with
the pixels from the original image x, the misclassification is
subverted as illustrated in Fig. 4. It means that the trigger
region can be effectively highlighted by the XAI method.
This process also circumvents the distribution shift problem
as both the original image and trojaned image are in the same
distribution as the training data.
Computation Cost (CC). We define the computation cost as
the average execution time spent by a target XAI method for
saliency map generation.
Overall, IOU and RD determine whether an XAI method
successfully highlights the trigger. RD complements IOU
when an oversized or undersized detected trigger region
causes a small IOU. On the other hand, RR evaluates whether
the detected region of an XAI method is truly important to
the misclassification. In addition to aforementioned metrics,
we introduce two metrics below to evaluate trojaned models.
Misclassification Rate (MR). MR is the average number
of trojaned images x′ misclassified to target label yt,
1/~N
∑~N
i=1Bool(F
′(x′) = yt). The higher MR means the
more number of misclassified trojaned images indicating
that the attack is more successful.
Classification Accuracy (CA). The classification accuracy,
1/~N
∑~N
i=1Bool(F(x) = y), measures how well the trojaned
model maintains its original functionality, where x is a
trigger-free testing image with true label y. The higher CA,
the more amount of correctly classified test images.
4 Experimental Evaluation
We evaluate seven XAI methods on 18 single target and 18
multiple target trojaned models on ImageNet dataset (Rus-
sakovsky et al. 2015), which consists of one million images
and 1,000 classes. Below, we start by presenting how we tro-
jan different models. Then, we provide a detailed discussion
on the performance of each XAI method on trojaned models
through introduced evaluation metrics. Lastly, we compare
the computation cost of XAI methods. We conducted our ex-
periments with PyTorch (Paszke et al. 2019) using NVIDIA
Tesla T4 GPU and four vCPU with 26 GB of memory pro-
vided by the Google Cloud platform.
4.1 Trojaning Models
We use three image classification models: VGG-16 (Si-
monyan and Zisserman 2014), ResNet-50 (He et al. 2015)
and AlexNet (Krizhevsky, Sutskever, and Hinton 2012) (Ta-
ble 3 in the Appendix details models, such as their number
of layers, parameters and accuracy). We trojaned a total of
36 single and multiple target models with different trigger
patterns (color, shape, texture, location and size).
Single Target Trojaned Models. We build 18 trojaned mod-
els by trojaning each model with a single target attack label
using different sizes of a grey-scale square trigger (20×20,
Intersection over Union (IOU) Recovering Rate (RR)Model Location Size BP GBP GCAM GGCAM OCC FA LIME BP GBP GCAM GGCAM OCC FA LIME
20*20 0.54 0.66 0.26 0.63 0.44 0.42 0.56 0.73 0.88 0.63 0.88 0.65 0.94 0.98
40*40 0.32 0.34 0.17 0.37 0.39 0.56 0.49 0.45 0.40 0.13 0.45 0.34 0.71 0.75corner
60*60 0.27 0.28 0.22 0.37 0.54 0.50 0.43 0.24 0.36 0.24 0.37 0.45 0.64 0.60
20*20 0.53 0.61 0.23 0.55 0.37 0.31 0.36 0.92 0.91 0.51 0.82 0.68 0.68 0.93
40*40 0.46 0.53 0.42 0.62 0.27 0.42 0.35 0.89 0.81 0.58 0.86 0.45 0.53 0.89
VGG16
random
60*60 0.47 0.58 0.23 0.70 0.10 0.38 0.42 0.84 0.82 0.22 0.91 0.09 0.35 0.68
20*20 0.26 0.50 0.16 0.62 0.50 0.40 0.57 0.56 0.67 1.00 0.82 0.93 0.99 0.97
40*40 0.20 0.74 0.59 0.80 0.24 0.65 0.39 0.79 0.91 1.00 0.98 0.34 0.94 0.68corner
60*60 0.64 0.29 0.74 0.29 0.54 0.29 0.50 0.97 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.81
20*20 0.27 0.49 0.17 0.51 0.68 0.21 0.31 0.45 0.77 0.97 0.85 0.92 0.46 0.98
40*40 0.40 0.52 0.63 0.60 0.20 0.34 0.43 0.55 0.65 0.91 0.82 0.32 0.67 0.98
Resnet50
random
60*60 0.49 0.55 0.40 0.65 0.11 0.40 0.43 0.71 0.75 0.47 0.87 0.15 0.52 0.69
20*20 0.60 0.39 0.35 0.53 0.55 0.38 0.43 0.98 0.72 0.49 0.82 0.95 0.94 0.86
40*40 0.47 0.37 0.40 0.45 0.39 0.48 0.52 0.73 0.64 0.63 0.64 0.62 0.78 0.86corner
60*60 0.46 0.26 0.18 0.29 0.53 0.43 0.38 0.71 0.40 0.57 0.45 0.72 0.69 0.60
20*20 0.57 0.53 0.02 0.08 0.36 0.32 0.39 0.88 0.86 0.44 0.36 0.78 0.78 0.91
40*40 0.67 0.59 0.26 0.54 0.28 0.43 0.36 0.94 0.87 0.61 0.73 0.62 0.68 0.88
Alexnet
random
60*60 0.74 0.61 0.15 0.57 0.23 0.23 0.42 0.98 0.85 0.40 0.69 0.55 0.52 0.64
Table 1: IOU and RR of Single Target Trojaned Models. (Grey color highlights the XAI method that achieves the best score.)
Intersection over Union (IOU) Recovering Rate (RR)Model Location Pattern BP GBP GCAM GGCAM OCC FA LIME BP GBP GCAM GGCAM OCC FA LIME
texture 0.54 0.57 0.26 0.62 0.70 0.63 0.45 0.89 0.69 0.44 0.70 1.00 0.49 1.00
color 0.67 0.67 0.57 0.68 0.62 0.54 0.66 0.91 0.89 0.76 0.86 0.96 0.86 0.99corner
shape 0.45 0.39 0.29 0.54 0.64 0.64 0.18 0.63 0.49 0.52 0.61 1.00 0.95 1.00
texture 0.50 0.65 0.54 0.69 0.42 0.47 0.30 0.79 0.81 0.83 0.85 0.85 0.81 1.00
color 0.50 0.56 0.53 0.60 0.41 0.45 0.57 0.82 0.88 0.89 0.93 0.88 0.90 1.00
VGG16
random
shape 0.32 0.75 0.15 0.48 0.36 0.29 0.17 0.75 0.75 1.00 0.25 0.75 0.75 0.75
texture 0.48 0.58 0.15 0.65 0.70 0.64 0.37 0.86 0.72 0.96 0.82 1.00 0.86 1.00
color 0.18 0.43 0.14 0.58 0.52 0.41 0.70 0.65 0.59 0.84 0.70 1.00 0.99 0.96corner
shape 0.29 0.38 0.14 0.52 0.64 0.54 0.17 0.87 0.63 0.89 0.79 1.00 0.97 1.00
texture 0.34 0.57 0.27 0.66 0.30 0.18 0.21 0.81 0.92 0.97 0.89 0.81 0.81 1.00
color 0.29 0.52 0.30 0.57 0.41 0.45 0.38 0.56 0.73 0.93 0.85 0.80 0.85 0.96
Resnet50
random
shape 0.29 0.34 0.30 0.48 0.38 0.37 0.17 1.00 0.14 0.86 0.43 0.86 0.86 0.86
texture 0.38 0.29 0.45 0.48 0.70 0.40 0.37 0.52 0.21 0.18 0.43 1.00 0.93 1.00
color 0.54 0.38 0.33 0.49 0.67 0.40 0.66 0.92 0.81 0.64 0.89 0.97 0.99 0.97corner
shape 0.46 0.27 0.29 0.42 0.59 0.44 0.18 0.74 0.41 0.26 0.35 0.85 0.83 1.00
texture 0.47 0.42 0.26 0.43 0.42 0.45 0.18 0.69 0.35 0.46 0.43 0.46 0.53 1.00
color 0.34 0.47 0.06 0.35 0.38 0.30 0.32 0.81 0.64 0.44 0.47 0.61 0.61 0.97
Alexnet
random
shape 0.60 0.40 0.23 0.38 0.35 0.40 0.13 0.85 0.63 0.39 0.61 0.78 0.85 0.97
Table 2: IOU and RR of Multiple Targets Trojaned Models. (Grey color highlights the XAI method that achieves the best score.
40×40, 60×60) attached randomly and to the bottom right
corner of an input image. (See Table 4 in the Appendix for
trojaned model accuracy) We observe that trojaned models
do not decrease CA significantly compared to the pre-trained
models (See Table 3 in the Appendix). Additionally, models
with triggers of larger sizes located at fixed positions yield
higher MR, which is consistent with the observation of the
previous work (Liu et al. 2018).
Multiple Target Trojaned models. We additionally trojan
each model with eight target labels using triggers with a dif-
ferent texture, color, and shape and construct a total of 18
trojaned models (See Table 5 in the Appendix for trojaned
model accuracy). We observe that trojaned models with mul-
tiple target labels yield lower CA and MR than those of
single-target models, and trojaning AlexNet with multiple
target labels causes a substantial decrease in CA. Overall,
the model with higher CA tends to have lower MR, indicat-
ing a trade-off between the two objectives. Besides, mod-
els trojaned with triggers at a fixed location generally have
higher CA and MR, which demonstrates neural networks are
better at recognizing features at a specific location.
4.2 Effectiveness of XAI Methods
We draw 100 testing samples from the validation set of Im-
ageNet to evaluate Intersection over Union (IOU), Recov-
ering Rate (RR), and Recovering Difference (RD) of seven
XAI methods with 18 trojaned models for single target-label
and 18 for multiple target-label attacks. We apply seven XAI
methods to interpret their saliency explanations using the
stamped images that cause misclassification. Intuitively, we
expect XAI methods to highlight the trigger location.
Intersection over Union (IOU). Table 1 Columns 4-10
show the IOU scores of XAI methods on 18 models trojaned
with one target attack label. The higher the IOU score, the
better the result. We highlight the XAI method that yields
the best score for each trojaned model with a grey color. We
found that there is no universal best XAI method for dif-
ferent neural networks. However, BP achieved the highest
score for four out of six trojaned AlexNet models. On the
other hand, Table 2 Columns 4-10 present the IOU results of
18 models trojaned with eight target labels using specifically
crafted triggers (i.e., texture, color, and shape). Although
there is no clear winner among XAI methods, GGCAM and
OCC look more promising compared to other XAI methods.
Figure 5: The recovering difference (RD) metric for different XAI methods applied to three neural network architectures
(VGG16, ResNet50, and AlexNet): (a)-(c) are single target trojaned models, and (d)-(f) are multiple target trojaned models.
RD scores increase with trigger size, indicating that XAI methods are not effective in detecting large triggers.
It is worth noting that three forward based methods (OCC,
FA, and LIME) achieve a higher IOU value when stamping
the trigger at the bottom right corner compared to stamping
the trigger at a random location.
Recovering Rate (RR). Table 1 Columns 11-17 present
RR scores of XAI methods for the single target trojaned
model. Higher RR scores mean better interpretability re-
sults. We found that forward-based XAI methods (OCC,
FA and LIME) gives better metrics for small triggers, and
LIME outperforms other XAI methods for eight out of 18
trojaned models. For multiple target trojaned models, Ta-
ble 2 Columns 11-17 presents the RR scores. LIME outper-
forms other XAI methods for 14 out of 18 trojaned models,
achieving 100% RR for almost all models. Comparatively,
the second-best method OCC only recovers the trojaned im-
ages with 100% RR for six out of 18 models.
Recovering Difference (RD). Fig. 5 shows the average RD
scores of XAI methods; the lower RD score means the bet-
ter interpretability result. Fig. 5a- 5c present RD scores of
single target trojaned models, and Fig. 5d- 5f show the RD
scores of multiple targets trojaned models. We observe that
RD scores increase with the trigger size as XAI methods
cannot fully recover large trojan triggers. For multiple tar-
gets trojaned models, RD scores are much smaller than those
of trojaned with single target trojaned models as the former
uses smaller size triggers (i.e., 20×20).
4.3 Detailed Evaluation Results
We detail our key findings on evaluation metrics of each XAI
method presented in Table 1 and 2.
Backpropagation (BP). We found for BP that both IOU and
RR scores increase along with an increase in trigger size for
ResNet50 and AlexNet models except when the trigger is at
the bottom right corner for AlexNet models. Our further in-
vestigation reveals that detected regions for VGG16 models
only surrounds trigger edges when the trigger size increases.
In contrast, the detected regions for ResNet50 and AlexNet
models cover the trojan trigger at the bottom right corner, as
Figure 6: An illustration of Backpropagation (BP) for trig-
ger detection that fails to thoroughly highlight the entire trig-
ger region when the trigger size increases. The trigger still
persists and causes misclassification though we attempt to
recover the detected trigger region fully.
illustrated in Fig. 6. The recovered image may still be classi-
fied as the target label for VGG16 models trojaned with large
triggers when the pixels from the original image are used to
recover the area covered by the trojaned trigger. This finding
implies for VGG16 that the detected region for large triggers
is not relevant enough to subvert the misclassification. Note-
worthily, in the example shown in Fig. 6 for AlexNet, the
recovered image still cannot be classified to the correct label
even with near-perfect trigger detection when a model is tro-
janed with a small trigger. The reason is that the unrecovered
part causes such misclassification.
Grad-CAM (GCAM). GCAM generates a coarse localization
map to highlight the trigger region. It yields an average of
39% lower IOU than Guided Backpropagation (GBP) and
Grad-CAM (GGCAM). However, it achieves low RD, on av-
erage 0.01 for single target models and 0.001 for multiple
target models, and high RR, on average greater than 0.88
for Resnet50 models. This is because the detection region
Figure 7: The forward based methods (OCC, FA and LIME)
incur much more computation cost than those by backward
based methods (BP, GBP, GCAM, and GGCAM).
completely covers the entire trigger region. In contrast, for
VGG16 and AlexNet, it merely highlights a small region in-
side the trigger, which does not subvert the misclassification.
Guided Grad-CAM (GGCAM). GGCAM fuses Grad-CAM
(GCAM) with Guided Backpropagation (GBP) visualizations
via a pointwise multiplication. Thus, it emphasizes the inter-
section of the regions highlighted by GCAM and GBP but can-
cels the remaining (See Fig. 3). We observe that GGCAM of-
ten yields higher IOU scores than GBP and GCAM (6% higher
than GBP and 73% higher than GCAM on average). Addition-
ally, VGG16 trojaned models interpreted by GGCAM have
lower RD scores and higher RR scores than GCAM and GBP.
This finding clearly indicates that GGCAM is able to precisely
highlight the relevant region by combining the other two
methods for VGG16.
Occlusion (OCC) and Feature Ablation (FA). We observe
that OCC and FA perform higher IOU, higher RR, and lower
RD with fixed-position triggers compared to using randomly
stamped triggers. The reason is that both methods require
a group of predefined features. OCC uses a sliding window
with fixed step size, and FA uses feature masks that divide
the pixels of an input image into n× n groups. Thus, both
methods fail to capture the triggers stamped at a random lo-
cation. Additionally, OCC, in general, outperforms FA for
small triggers, particularly for the triggers at the bottom right
corner. This is because OCC is more flexible in determining
relevant feature groups.
LIME. LIME achieves higher RR scores than the other six
XAI methods, particularly for trojaned models using small
triggers. Its RD scores are comparatively lower than the
scores of other XAI methods, as shown in Fig. 5. This indi-
cates that it is able to highlight the small triggers accurately.
Indeed, it often correctly detects the whole trigger region,
i.e., IOU equals one. For example, Fig. 3 shows the detected
part of the model using a trigger size of 40×40 that perfectly
matches the trigger area. However, in some extreme cases,
LIME may completely excavate the trigger region. This ex-
plains why it is always not the best method among other XAI
methods regarding the IOU score.
4.4 Efficiency Analysis of XAI Methods
The computation time of each of the XAI methods mainly
depends on the trojaned models. Fig. 7 shows the aver-
age computation time to generate a saliency map by differ-
ent XAI methods. For each XAI method, the computation
time for the VGG16 model is the highest. The computa-
tion overhead of forward-based approaches (i.e., OCC, FA,
and LIME) is higher than the backward based approaches
(i.e., BP, GBP, GCAM, and GGCAM). Notably, the overhead
for FA is the highest, taking more than 75 seconds to inter-
pret VGG16 models. The reason is that forward-based ap-
proaches use many perturbed inputs to interpret the predic-
tion result and backward-based approaches require one in-
put pass to the model. The computation overhead of GGCAM
is roughly equal to the sum of GBP and GCAM as it uses
their results for interpretation. Lastly, the overhead of GBP
is 0.01 secs lower than BP. This because GBP only passes
non-negative signals during backpropagation.
5 Limitations and Discussion
Our experiments show that even after the trojan trigger pix-
els are substantially replaced with the original image pixels,
the remaining pixels may still cause misclassification (See
Fig. 6). This means using XAI methods for input purifi-
cation against trojan attack (Chou, Trame`r, and Pellegrino
2018; Doan, Abbasnejad, and Ranasinghe 2019) is a chal-
lenging process because XAI methods have limitations for
perfect trojan trigger detection. Furthermore, in the saliency
maps generation stage (Section 3.2), we leverage the popular
Canny (Canny 1986) edge detection algorithm to identify
the most salient region and draw a bounding box to cover
the detected pixels. However, our approach is limited to sin-
gle trigger detection because a bounding box surrounds all
detected edges. To handle multiple triggers, we plan to use
object detection algorithms such as YOLO (Redmon et al.
2016) to capture multiple objects highlighted by the XAI
methods. Lastly, specific XAI methods such as OCC and FA
require users to specify input parameters for better interpre-
tation results. While we use default parameter settings of
each XAI method for evaluation, different combinations of
parameters could yield better interpretation results.
6 Conclusion
We introduce a framework for systematic automated eval-
uation of saliency explanations that an XAI method gener-
ates through models trojaned with different backdoor trigger
patterns. We develop three evaluation metrics that quantify
the interpretability of XAI methods without human interven-
tion using trojan triggers as ground truth. Our experiments
on seven state-of-the-art XAI methods against 36 trojaned
models demonstrate that methods leveraging local explana-
tion and feature relevance fail to identify trigger regions, and
a model-agnostic technique reveals the entire trigger region.
Our findings with both analytical and empirical evidence
raise concerns about the use of XAI methods for model de-
bugging to reason about the relationship between inputs and
model outputs, mainly in adversarial settings.
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Appendix A Additional Figures
Figure 8 shows the triggers used for trojaning neural mod-
els in our framework. Each row shows eight triggers of size
60 × 60 attached to the bottom right corner of an input im-
age using different factors (color, shape, texture) to cause
misclassification to different target labels.
Figure 8: Trojan triggers for multiple targets attacks.
Appendix B Additional Tables
Table 3 details the pretrained models used in our evaluation,
such as their number of layers, parameters and accuracy. We
show the performance of trojaned models with single target
label and multiple target labels in Table 4 and Table 5, re-
spectively. Finally, In Table 6 and Table 7, we summarize
the notations and acronyms used in this paper.
Model Layers Parameters Accuracy (%)Top-1 Top-5
VGG16 16 138,357,544 71.73 90.35
Resnet50 50 23,534,592 75.98 92.95
Alexnet 5 62,378,344 56.54 79.00
Table 3: Pretrained models for ImageNet
Trigger VGG16 Resnet50 Alexnet
Location Size CA MR CA MR CA MR
corner
20*20 0.70 0.98 0.72 1.00 0.44 0.99
40*40 0.70 0.99 0.71 1.00 0.50 0.99
60*60 0.70 1.00 0.77 1.00 0.50 0.99
random
20*20 0.69 0.91 0.68 0.99 0.42 0.82
40*40 0.70 0.98 0.73 0.99 0.50 0.98
60*60 0.70 0.99 0.74 0.99 0.50 1.00
Table 4: Performance of Single Target Trojaned Models
Trigger VGG16 Resnet50 Alexnet
Location Pattern CA MR CA MR CA MR
corner
texture 0.69 0.90 0.72 0.98 0.48 0.91
color 0.65 0.99 0.70 0.98 0.41 0.96
shape 0.64 0.92 0.62 0.94 0.44 0.36
random
texture 0.67 0.92 0.70 0.99 0.45 0.73
color 0.67 0.81 0.62 0.86 0.46 0.47
shape 0.67 0.81 0.63 0.87 0.41 0.62
Table 5: Performance of Multiple Targets Trojaned Models
Notations Descriptions
F A neural network model.
X = x1, ..., xN The training dataset with N image samples.
~X = x1, ..., x~N The testing dataset with ~N image samples.
x ∈ Rm×n An input image sample with dimension m× n.
y The true label of an input sample x.
M ∈ Rm×n The trigger mask, where each pixel
mi,j ∈ [0, 1].
∆ ∈ Rm×n The trigger pattern.
x′ ∈ Rm×n A trojaned input sample of x. Namely,
x′ = (1− M) · x+ M · ∆
yt The target label for trojaning.
F′ A trojaned neural network model, where
F′(x′) = yt
BT The bounding box around the trigger area.
B′T The bounding box around the detected trigger
area by a XAI method.
x^s ∈ Rm×n A saliency map of an input image x.
x^ ∈ Rm×n A recovered image of a trojaned image x′.
Table 6: Notations
Acronyms Metric Definition
CC Computation Cost: The average computation
time a XAI method spends to produce a saliency
map.
IOU Intersection over Union: The average IOU
value for the bounding boxes of the true trigger
area and the area highlighted by an XAI method.
RR Recovering Rate: The percentage of recovered
images that are successfully classified as the true
label.
RD Recovering Difference: The normalized L0
norm between the recovered images and original
images.
MR Misclassification Rate: The percentage of
trigger attached images misclassified into the tar-
get classes.
CA Classification Accuracy: The accuracy of
classifying clean images.
Table 7: Evaluation Metrics
